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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: ACCOMMODATING THE
PUBLIC NEED WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS-Orion
Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.1
Traditional common law notions of property resist recognition of a
diffuse public right in privately held lands. The public trust doctrine,
an historical exception to this general rule, allows states to reserve a
public right to lands underlying their navigable and tidal bodies of
water. The doctrine originally preserved the public use of navigable
waters for commerce and fishing. More recently, however, courts aim
the doctrine at the public uses of recreation, ecological study, and aes-
thetic enjoyment. As the interests protected by the doctrine expand,
one thing remains constant: the doctrine's relation to water.
z'Citizens are increasingly using the public trust doctrine as an effec-
tive legal tool for vindicating the public's preexisting rights in pri-
vately held lands.' The doctrine's recent popularity represents an
overdue recognition of the public's right to protect and enjoy natural
resources that by their character should be accessible and open to the
public.
Despite the public trust doctrine's merits, two significant factors
restrain extension of the doctrine beyond its traditional reach:' history
and the constitution.4 The doctrine's history shows its traditional
1. J. INST. 2.1.1.
2. See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970) (discussing the increasing use of the public trust
doctrine as a tool of judicial intervention by private citizens to protect the public interest in
environmental quality).
3. For purposes of this article, the physical confines of the public trust will be referred to as
the "reach" of the doctrine. The range of public interests protected by the public trust doctrine
will be referred to as the "scope" of the doctrine.
4. The United States Constitution protects persons from deprivation of property without due
process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It also guarantees that property will not be
taken for a public purpose without payment of just compensation. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
Expansion of the reach of the public trust doctrine might encroach upon private property
interests and trigger these protections. For example, if the public trust is characterized as a
public easement, expanding its historical reach onto private property might constitute a taking.
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987); see infra note 99 and
accompanying text. Expansion of the public trust doctrine, however, might also be characterized
as a land-use regulation. In this area, the Orion court recognized that conceptually both due
process analysis and takings analysis apply. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 648-49, 747
P.2d 1062, 1076-77 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988). In Washington, excessive
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relationship to certain bodies of water, lending continuity and predict-
ability to the doctrine's reach. This continuity fulfills constitutional
property protections' guarantees of certainty and uniformity. 5 Expan-
sion of the doctrine's historical reach-to lands unrelated to water, for
example-could undermine its certainty and uniformity, overreaching
these constitutional limits.
Constitutional and historical restraints may allow for expansion of
the public trust doctrine in a different direction, however. Regulation
of activities outside the public trust's reach that cause harmful spil-
lover effects on public trust lands may fit within constitutional stric-
tures. This extension could vindicate preexisting public rights while
retaining harmony with the doctrine's historical limits and constitu-
tional property protections.
Following decades of neglecting its public trust duties, 6 Washington
now accepts the public trust doctrine as a permanent fixture in its law.
In Orion Corp. v. State,7 the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed
the state's sovereign interest as the public's trustee8 in its tidelands,9
marshes, and shorelands.t° The court declared that private use of pro-
tected trust lands must conform to the public's interest in navigation,
fishing, and recreation, 1 and must not be harmful to the land's depen-
dent wildlife. 2 The court, however, declined to define the public
regulation may constitute a taking if it goes beyond preventing a public harm and actually
confers a public benefit. Id. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078; see also infra note 85. Under federal
takings analysis, a taking hinges on whether denial of use of the property results in a sufficiently
significant economic deprivation to the property owner. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2386-88 (1987).
5. Constitutional due process guarantees protect the reasonable expectations of property
owners regarding the economic use of their property. Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2082
(1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979). Regulations that deprive owners of economically viable uses of their
property may violate due process and constitute a taking, requiring just compensation.
6. See Allison, The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633
(1987); see also infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
7. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
8. Id. at 638-40, 747 P.2d at 1071-73.
9. Lands over which the tide ebbs and flows generally fall within the reach of the public trust
doctrine.
10. At common law, the proprietors of lands adjoining fresh water lakes or ponds, which are
public, hold to the ordinary low-water mark. 3. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS,
106 (3d ed. 1900). Owners of lands adjoining a navigable river have no private right of property
in the waters of the river, or in its shores below high water mark. Id. at 303. In Washington, the
relative rights of the public and private property owners in navigable lakes and streams fluctuate
with the natural fluctuations of the water level. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 314-15,
462 P.2d 232, 238 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
11. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.




trust's reach, stating only that it is coextensive with the public need.13
This standard suggests a willingness to further extend the public trust
beyond its water-based context. Such an extension could encounter
constitutional obstacles.
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST: AN ANCIENT RIGHT
REVITALIZED
A. Historical Development of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine was first expressed in the works of Justin-
ian. 4 According to Roman legal principles, the law of nature pro-
vides for communal rights in the most basic of natural resources,
including water. 5 The public right of fishing and navigation 16 extends
to rivers, their banks,' 7 the seashore, and the sea itself.-i' Roman law
recognized private ownership in the banks of rivers despite the public's
right of use,19 but the seashore belonged to no one.2°
The thirteenth century writings of Bracton, the renowned English
jurist and student of Roman civil law, introduced the public trust doc-
trine to the English common law.2' According to Bracton, the shore,
that ground between the ordinary high-water and low-water marks,
belonged to the crown.22 The crown's ownership extended to both the
shore of the sea and the shore of the arms of the sea.
23
The Magna Charta reasserted the public interest in navigation of the
realm's navigable streams.24 The Magna Charta and subsequent stat-
13. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1073.







21. S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 31 (1888).
22. Id. at 31-33; see also J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE
WATERS AND IN THE SOILS AND SHORES THEREOF 17-18 (1826). Common law policy assigned
everything capable of occupancy a legal proprietor. Things which by nature could not be
exclusively occupied and enjoyed were the property of the sovereign. In England, the king was
regarded as the universal occupant, and all property was originally in the crown. The crown,
therefore, enjoyed sovereign dominion over the sea adjoining the coasts and over the "arms of the
seas," and a vested right of property in the underlying soil. LORD HALE, SIR MATTHEW HALE'S
FIRST TREATISE 361 (1786), reprinted in S. MOORE, supra note 21, at 318. According to Hale,
wherever the tide flows constitutes an arm of the sea.
23. LORD HALE, supra note 22, at 318.
24. Id. at 28. When the Magna Charta was issued in 1215, nearly the entire coastline of
England had been granted away by the king. See also S. MOORE, supra note 21, at 31. Bracton
omitted that section of Justinian's Institutes that proscribed private property in the shores. This
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utes forbade the use of privately erected fishing structures which
impeded the passage of vessels.25 These statutes, however, did not
deny landowners' proprietary interests in their shoreland. The stat-
utes required only that such interests, whether obtained by grant or by
prescription, did not prejudice the public's right to use public rivers or
arms of the sea.2 6 This public right, orjuspublicum, resembled a pub-
lic easement in the shores and arms of the sea.
2 7
B. Acceptance and Development of the Doctrine in the United States
The United States Supreme Court ensconced the public trust doc-
trine in American jurisprudence in Martin v. Waddell.28 Martin vali-
dated the existence of the public trust doctrine in America, and
defined its reach. According to the Court, the states as sovereigns
inherit the same rights in the lands underlying their navigable waters
as those previously held by the crown.29 This preexisting public right
omission reflects Bracton's recognition that, throughout the kingdom, the foreshore was in many
places held as property by private hands, although subject to the public right of use for fishing
and navigation. Id.
25. See LORD HALE, DE JURE MARiS 374, 388-89 (1786), reprinted in S. MOORE, supra note
21 (citing several of the particular statutes).
26. Id. at 389. According to Hale's treatise and other seventeenth century authorities, the
crown's interest in the navigable waters was twofold. First, the jus publicum represented the
crown's sovereign interest as trustee for the public to exercise dominion and control over the
navigable waters and their underlying beds for the public benefit. Second, the jus privatum
represented the crown's proprietary interest, which was always subject to the paramount jus
publicum, even when conveyed to private hands. See also J. GOULD, supra note 10, at 59 (under
common law, the public had no legal right to bathe in the sea).
27. See Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970). The easement approach is theoretically inconsistent with the
Roman model of public trust which eschewed private ownership in favor of communal
ownership of public trust lands. Id. at 769. The easement approach probably represents a
compromise in the common law between the public interest of navigation and fishing, and
proprietary interests in shorelands that had passed into private ownership.
28. 41 U.S. 367 (1842). In Martin, the Court held that public trust powers over lands
underlying the navigable waters of a state are vested in the state, not the proprietary owner.
29. Id. at 416. British settlers brought the public trust doctrine to the New World when
England claimed America by the right of discovery. The colonies' public trust lands thereafter
became subject to all the rights and prerogatives of the crown. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 14 (1894). When the Revolution took place, those rights and prerogatives passed to the
citizens of the states by the right of conquest. See Martin, 41 U.S. at 410. Thus, they inherited
the absolute right to their navigable waters and the lands under them for their common use,
subject only to the rights surrendered to the general government under the Constitution. See id.
States that subsequently entered the Union acquired ownership of their navigable waters and




grew in significance as states sought to vindicate the public's right in
privately held public trust lands.30
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,31 the Court reemphasized
the state's standing as heir to preexisting rights to the beds of its navi-
gable waters.32 The Court observed that to account for the unique
topographical features of the American continent, and to protect
rights of navigation, prior cases had extended the reach of the public
trust doctrine to navigable fresh waters and the lands beneath them.
33
The Court explained this extension by finding that the traditional stan-
dard of the doctrine's reach, tidal influence, was synonymous with
navigability.34
Despite the tremendous influence of Illinois Central, a later
Supreme Court decision 35 indicated that Illinois Central rested on
state law. Its delineation of the public trust doctrine's reach did not
establish national precedent. The Supreme Court continues to recog-
nize the public trust doctrine as a prerogative of state government,
declining an active role in vindicating public trust rights. 36 This
approach leaves the standard defining the doctrine's reach unresolved.
30. In Martin, the Court declined to defer to state court judgments because the property
interests in question were created by charters of the British crown, not by the state. 41 U.S. at
417.
31. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
32. Id. at 457-59. The Court observed that the ownership and sovereignty over lands covered
by tide waters remain with the states in which the lands are found.
33. Id at 436. The Court observed that the English standard of navigability-where the tide
ebbs and flows-is incompatible with the topographical features of the American continent.
America, where navigation and commercewere frequently conducted on inland lakes and rivers,
needed a broader standard of "navigability in fact." See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-38
(1876); The Propellor Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 456 (1851).
34. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 436. The expansion of the public trust doctrine to navigable
fresh water rivers and lakes accompanied an expansion of the national admiralty jurisdiction over
the same waters. The Court's implication, that the reach of the public trust doctrine would be
parallel to the reach of the national government's admiralty jurisdiction, followed from
navigation being the primary subject of protection and regulation in both contexts.
35. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). In Appleby, the Court reversed
the ruling of the New York State Court of Appeals and held that under New York law the state
legislature could grant land underlying navigable tidal waters free of thejuspublicum. According
to the Court, if the state wished to reassert its sovereign interest in the land, it would have to pay
for it. Id. at 402-03. The Court had recognized the preeminence of state law in the public trust
context in earlier cases. See, eg., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) (no uniform law
concerning the circumstances under which a state can abdicate its sovereign and proprietary
interests in its public trust lands); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891) (earlier decisions
defining the reach of the public trust doctrine were not universal statements of the law).
36. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (finding no
preexisting public right of access to the ocean across private beach because the lower court did
not rest its decision on the public trust doctrine, although precedent relied on by the lower court
was replete with public trust language); see also infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
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Recently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi37 the Supreme
Court again declined to adopt a uniform standard defining the public
trust doctrine's reach and scope. Instead, it reaffirmed the states'
authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust.38 The
Court upheld Mississippi law extending state sovereignty to land
underlying nonnavigable waters influenced by the tide.39 Justice
White, writing for the majority, acknowledged the doctrine's tradi-
tional relation to navigability, but nevertheless acknowledged the
state's interests in lands beneath nonnavigable tidal waters. 4 He con-
cluded that navigable and nonnavigable tidal waters are alike in kind,
sharing the same geographical, chemical and environmental
qualities.4"
C. The Doctrine's Development in Washington
In view of Washington's extensive coastline,4" one might assume
that the public trust doctrine had an important role in developing state
policies. The state constitution gave early recognition to sovereign
ownership, asserting a proprietary interest in the lands underlying the
state's navigable and tidal waters.43 The state, however, showed more
37. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
38. Id. at 794.
39. Id. at 793. Claimants contested title to 42 acres of land lying several miles north of the
Mississippi Gulf Coast. Although not navigable, the land was submerged by tidal water. Id. at
791.
40. Id. at 795. The Court acknowledged that many states rejected the English "tidal
influence" standard of navigability in favor of a standard of "navigability in fact." Nonetheless,
the Court disavowed the notion that "navigability in fact" had replaced "tidal influence" in
defining the possible reach of the doctrine. The Court concluded that the "navigability in fact"
standard augmented the "tidal influence" standard rather than qualified it. Id. In light of the
Court's rationale, its holding should be read as a clarification of an historical ambiguity in the
public trust doctrine, not as an expansion of the doctrine's reach.
41. Id. at 798-99. The dissent, asserting that navigability, not tidal influence, ought to be
acknowledged as the universal hallmark of the public trust, drew a distinction between tidelands
that are a part of or immediately bordering a navigable body of water and tidelands underlying a
discrete and wholly nonnavigable body of water. The former, because of its relation to
navigation, would be burdened by the public trust; the latter would not. Id. at 802-03
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. The inland shoreline of Puget Sound alone extends more than 2, 100 miles. T. ANGELL &
K. BALCOMB III, MARINE BIRDS AND MAMMALS OF PUGET SOUND 2 (1982); see also,
McCormick, Puget Sound Given National Recognition, WASH. COASTAL CURRENTS, Apr. 1988,
at I (Environmental Protection Agency designated Puget Sound an estuary of national
significance).
43. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This section declares:
The State of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters
in the state, up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs
and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all
navigable rivers and lakes ....
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interest in the revenue it could obtain by disposing of its tidelands and
shorelands than in protecting a valuable state resource.44
Early Washington public trust cases emphasized the state's absolute
power to convey public trust lands free of any public right of access or
use.45 They rejected protecting the public's right of access and use of
public trust resources that had passed to private ownership. These
cases show a narrow construction of the extent of public rights in the
state's tidelands and shorelands. 4"
Early cases also failed to clearly define a standard to measure the
reach of the public trust doctrine. The state constitution's claim to
lands underlying tidal waters and its claim to the beds and shores of
all navigable waters'were asserted separately.47 This suggests that the
constitution intended tidal influence, in addition to navigability in fact,
to define the reach of the state's public trust doctrine. Indeed, an early
case4' held that if the body of water in question was influenced by the
tide, then its bed and shores belonged to the state as a matter of state
constitutional law.49 Other cases emphasized navigability in defining
the state's public interest in its tidelands and shorelands.5 ° Given the
express language of the state constitution, however, the historical
44. See State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 171, 135 P. 1035, 1040 (1913), where the court
observed:
Those who sat in the constitutional convention, and those who met in our early legislative
assemblies, were confronted with an important problem when treating the subject of tide
and shore lands. Many insisted that the state should reserve title and that the land should
never be sold. Others maintained that the best interests of the state demanded that they pass
into private ownership, thus becoming a subject of taxation and revenue to the state. The
latter theory prevailed, subject to the qualification that the harbor area should never be
disposed of.
45. See, ag., Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 244-45, 26 P. 539 (1891). In Eisenbach, the
court, after a survey of Supreme Court decisions, concluded that title to the state's tidelands
belong to the state. The court reasoned that the state had full power to dispose of them, subject
to no restrictions except those imposed upon the legislature by the state and federal constitutions.
Further, the court found that no individual can have any legal right to claim any easement in, or
to impose any servitude upon, the state's tide waters without the consent of the legislature. Id. at
541; see also Puget Mill Co. v. State, 93 Wash. 128, 135, 160 P. 310, 313 (1916); Palmer v.
Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 76, 105 P. 179, 180 (1909); Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54
Wash. 83, 90, 102 P. 1041, 1044 (1909); Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, 133,
94 P. 922, 924 (1908).
46. The state regarded the national government's authority to regulate commerce and the
public's right of navigation as the only limitation on its power to dispose of its tidelands and
shorelands. See, eg., Sturtevant, 76 Wash. at 165, 135 P. at 1037 (observation by the court that
"[tihe only right which the state has ever undertaken to maintain in trust for the whole people is
the right of navigation.").
47. See supra note 43.
48. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. at 83, 102 P. at 1041.
49. Id. at 91, 102 P. at 1044.
50. See, eg., supra note 46.
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reach of the state's public trust interest could extend to all lands influ-
enced by the tide as well as those underlying navigable fresh water
rivers and lakes.
D. Orion Corp. v. State
Orion involved a classic regulatory taking dispute between a private
landowner and the state. Orion Corporation owned, or had options to
buy, nearly eighty percent of the land underlying Padilla Bay.5" This
estuary sustains an immensely diverse and densely populated ecosys-
tem. 2 Orion planned to dredge and fill this land to create a Venetian-
style community for 30,000 people. 3 A 1969 court decision, however,
cut short Orion's development plans. Wilbour v. Gallagher54 upheld
the public's right to travel all navigable waters, even when these
waters lie over privately owned lands.55 In response to Wilbour, the
Governor immediately imposed a moratorium on all tideland filling
projects.5 6 The legislature, at the end of this legal chain reaction,
enacted the Shoreline Management Act ("SMA") in 197 17
The SMA identified Padilla Bay as one of five shorelines of state-
wide significance.5 8 Subsequent state and local land use regulations
foreclosed the use of Orion's land for the intended dredge and fill pro-
ject.5 9 The only remaining possible uses of value were nondisruptive
51. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 444, 693 P.2d 1369, 1372 (1985).
52. Over 239 species of birds inhabit the estuary. Many use the bay as a resting and feeding
spot on their migratory routes. The bay serves also as a wintering spot for thousands of brant,
ducks, and other sea birds, including loons, grebes and gulls. Bald eagles nest on the shore of the
bay and feed on the bay's chum salmon during the winter when the salmon runs are low in the
upper rivers. The bay is the location of one of the greatest blue heron colonies in Washington. It
supports one of the densest wintering populations of peregrine falcons in North America. These
falcons, an endangered species, roost in the area and use the entire bay for hunting. The bay is
also home to a significant population of harbor seals, and harbor seals from other parts of Puget
Sound come to bear their pups there. Perhaps the most ecologically significant feature of Padilla
Bay is its abundance of eelgrass. Covering 73 percent of the bay, it is the second largest eelgrass
bed on the West Coast. This eelgrass and the microorganisms it supports provide food and cover
for several important species, including various species of fish and crabs. The eelgrass meadows
serve also as a feeding ground for the bay's huge bird population. The bay is an important
spawning site for herring, as well as a significant location for the growth ofjuvenile salmon. See
Petitioner's Brief at 8-14, Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
53. Orion, 103 Wash. 2d at 444, 693 P.2d at 1372.
54. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
55. Id. at 315-16, 462 P.2d at 238.
56. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 627, 747 P.2d at 1066.
57. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1985).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(e)(ii)(E) (1985).
59. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 626, 747 P.2d at 1066.
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recreation and aquaculture.1 Recognizing Orion's economic frustra-
tion,6 1 the state sought to compromise on the "takings" issue, offering
to buy Orion's land without threat of subsequent condemnation.62
Orion rejected the state's offer. Instead it brought suit alleging an
inverse condemnation of its property.63
The Orion court dismissed Orion's contention that it had a vested
interest in the use of its tidelands for a dredge and fill project.64 The
court found that state and local governments' preclusion of Orion's
dredging and filling of Padilla Bay had placed no greater burden on
Orion's land than that which had always existed under the public trust
doctrine.65 This burden precluded any use of the land incompatible
with the public trust, even if Orion were denied all economically viable
use of its land.66 Therefore, the state's historical role as trustee to its
public trust lands allowed it, without violating federal constitutional
limits,67 to prevent Orion from making any economically viable use of
its property. 68
The Orion court did not indicate how far the state's public trust
interest extended. It stated, however, that the trust's reach was not
limited by its relationship to the waters. Rather, its historical reach
merely recognized where the public need lay.6 9 Unfortunately, the
court's treatment of the public trust issue was cursory,7 0 and the court
60. Aquaculture includes the production of food fish, shell fish, and other aquatic plants and
animals in fresh or salt water. It often requires development offish hatcheries, rearing pens and
structures, and shellfish rafts, as well as use of natural spawning and rearing areas. Id at 628
n.3, 747 P.2d at 1066 n.3.
61. Orion claimed an appraised value of its land, based on its use as reclaimed farmland
which would require dredging and filling, of $1,200 per acre. The state's final offer for the land
was $100 per acre. Iad at 629-30, 747 P.2d at 1067. Orion's acquisition cost for 5,600 acres of its
land in Padilla Bay, acquired between 1963 and 1968, was approximately $36 per acre in
nonconstant dollars. Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747
P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
62. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 629-30, 747 P.2d at 1067.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
65. Id. at 638-39, 747 P.2d at 1072.
66. Id. at 659-60, 747 P.2d at 1082-83.
67. See supra note 4.
68. The Orion court recognized that deprivation of all legally permissible use of Orion's land
would determine whether the burden imposed on Orion's land was a taking. Oion, 109 Wash.
2d at 659, 747 P.2d at 1082. The court concluded that Orion's intended dredge and fill project
was not a legally permissible use under the public trust doctrine. Id at 659, 747 P.2d at 1082-83.
The court went on to determine whether state and county regulation of Orion's land precluded
Orion from making an economically viable use of its land compatible with the public trust. Id. at
659-62, 747 P.2d at 1082-84.
69. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1073.
70. Of the 54 pages that comprised the court's opinion in Orion, approximately four pages
were devoted to discussion of the public trust doctrine. Id at 638-42, 747 P.2d at 1071-73.
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left unanswered fundamental questions regarding the doctrine's
reach.71 The land in Orion was unquestionably subject to the state's
public trust interest. The court's dictum, however, suggested a will-
ingness to consider future expansion of the doctrine beyond the state's
tidelands and shorelands.
II. EXTENDING THE PUBLIC TRUST'S REACH:
ACCOMMODATING PUBLIC NEED WITHIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
The Orion court recognized the traditional reach of the public trust
with its concomitant concept of a preexisting public right. The court,
however, also stated that the public trust's reach is coextensive with
the public need. This statement, when read in tandem with the court's
reliance on expansive views of the doctrine,72 invites speculation about
the true reach of Washington's public trust doctrine. Because the pub-
lic trust may encroach on private property interests, constitutional
property protections stand as an obstacle to expansion of the doctrine
beyond its traditional reach. Such constitutional limits, however,
might not prevent the state from regulating the use of non-public trust
land which has harmful spillover effects on public trust resources.73
In recent decades, the expansion of civilization has placed acute
strains on nature's limited store of resources. The resulting competi-
tion for dwindling resources74 caused some commentators and courts
to reexamine conventional property theory in light of public necessity.
Some have advocated a more comprehensive view of public property
which challenges the common law notion of absolute private property
rights. The public trust doctrine, with its legally recognized public
right component, has become a favored vehicle for asserting public
rights in privately owned land. Expansive theories of public property
rights, however, must be squared with constitutional protections of
private property. Extending the public trust doctrine to private prop-
erty, without a supporting claim to a preexisting public right, could
violate these constitutional limitations. Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have, in fact, implied that any constitutional broadening of the
71. In fact, the court specifically declined to define the total scope and reach of the doctrine,
deferring that opportunity until a later date. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d. at 1073.
72. See, e.g., id. at 641 n.10, 659, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10, 1083.
73. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Comment, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759
(1971) (due to intense competition for California's dwindling coastal resources, active state





public trust doctrine's reach must be consistent with its historical
reach as defined by each state.
A. Constitutional Restraints on Expansion of the Public Trust
Doctrine
1. Protection of Due Process and Takings Clauses
Federal constitutional protections of private property serve as a low
water mark when states apply their own constitutional provisions to
property disputes. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,75 the
United States Supreme Court held that states may interpret rights and
protections offered by their constitutions more broadly than those
offered by the federal constitution."6 The Court, however, qualified
this authority by declaring that states may not encroach upon private
rights and interests guaranteed under the federal constitution. 77 In
extending the reach of their public trust interests,, therefore, states are
bound by federal constitutional protections of private property.
Early expansion of the American frontier lent itself to state latitude
in defining the reach of public rights in areas where few, if any, private
property interests yet existed.78 However, private property interests
have since extended to the limits of that defined backdrop of public
rights, now acting as a deterrent to expansion of the public trust.7 9
Procedural due process requires that laws provide a model of pre-
dictability and uniformity on which persons can structure their
affairs."0 The federal constitution explicitly protects property interests
75. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
76. IaM at 81.
77. Id. In Pruneyard, shopping center owners claimed that the first amendment rights of a
group of students to solicit signatures for a petition on the shopping center's property violated
their constitutionally protected property right to exclude them. Id. at 82.
78. See G. GOGGrNS & C. WILKiNsON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
43-118 (1981) (discussion of the history of public land law and early expansion of the American
frontier).
79. See Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. 434, 438 (1865), where Justice Davis, discussing the
mid-nineteenth century colonization of the Western United States, observed:
The country was new, and rich in mineral wealth, and attracted settlers, whose industry and
enterprise produced an unparalleled state of prosperity. The enhanced value given to the
whole surface of the country by the discovery of gold, made it necessary to ascertain and
settle all private land claims, so that the real estate belonging to individuals could be
separated from the public domain.
80. See, eg., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (due
process protects persons from being unexpectedly haled into courtin a state where they have no
contacts or connections); see also supra note 5.
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with the guarantee of due process. 8' In addition, the takings clause of
the fifth amendment protects persons from uncompensated depriva-
tion of their property when taken for a public purpose.82 Excessive
regulation of property may also constitute a compensable taking when
it denies owners the beneficial use of their property.8 3 The underlying
principle of these constitutional protections of property is that govern-
ment may not force a few people to bear public burdens which, in
fairness, should be borne by the public at large.84
In Orion, the court was not restrained by constitutional limits in
denying Orion the intended use of its land. The Orion court viewed
the state's public trust restrictions on Orion's land as a preexisting
public right, not as a garden variety land-use regulation. The court
recognized the constitutional limitations on state property regula-
tion.85 According to the court, however, precluding a use of public
trust land incompatible with the public trust was not a taking because
the right to make such a use never existed. 86 The state's public trust
interest in Orion's land preceded and qualified Orion's proprietary
interest.87 The state was capable of denying Orion all beneficial use of
its property by recognizing existing rights in Orion's property.88 The
public's preexisting right was indispensable to the state's ability to pro-
tect the public trust interest without unconstitutionally interfering
with Orion's property rights.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV § 1 states: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." See also supra note 4. The fourteenth amendment extends
application of this guarantee to the states.
82. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states: "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." See also supra note 4. This guarantee also applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.
83. See supra note 5.
84. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2388 (1987).
85. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 655-56, 747 P.2d 1062, 1080-81 (1987), cert.
denied, 108"S. Ct. 1996 (1988). The court held that regulatory schemes merely imposing land use
restrictions to safeguard the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of
the area, are insulated from characterization as compensable takings. According to the court,
the constitutionality of these regulations is to be decided as a matter of due process, according to
standards of reasonableness. A regulation will be invalidated if it is found that it goes beyond
preventing a public harm to confer a public benefit. Where a regulation is not insulated, the
Orion court held that a taking can occur if (1) the regulation does not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, and (2) the property owner is deprived of all economically viable use of
the property. In such cases, complainants are entitled to just compensation if a taking occurred.
In both situations, the court looks to the deprivation of economic interests and expectations of
the property owner in assessing the constitutionality of the regulation. Id. at 648-49, 655-56, 747
P.2d at 1076-77, 1081.
86. Id. at 641, 659-60, 747 P.2d at 1073, 1082-83.
87. Id. at 638, 747 P.2d at 1072.
88. Id. at 659-60, 747 P.2d at 1082-83.
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,89 a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion, supports the Orion takings analysis, insofar as it recognized that
there are no constitutional limitations on the states' enforcing their
preexisting public trust rights. The Phillips majority disagreed with
the dissent's criticism that adoption of a tidal influence standard
would extend the traditional reach of the public trust, upsetting pri-
vate property interests.90 Rather, the majority concluded that Missis-
sippi law had consistently held that the public trust included all land
under tidewater.91 By focusing on the historical reach of the state's
public trust doctrine, the Court affirmed its concern that the doctrine
provide a uniform and consistent model92 upon which private prop-
erty interests can be established.93 The Court's emphasis on a histori-
cal claim to the state's asserted interests implicitly rejected the notion
that states are free to expand the reach of their public trust interest
beyond its traditional reach.
The historical location of borders separating distinct property inter-
ests may determine the reach of constitutional protections of private
property. The Phillips Court characterized the controversy before it as
a "quiet title suit." 94 The plaintiffs brought the action to settle con-
flicting claims to the same property.95 The Court used history and
state precedent to define the boundaries that separate the state public
trust interest from the claimed private property interest.96 This defini-
tion could establish the reach of constitutional protections of the pri-
vate claimant's property interests as well. Expansion of one interest
may encroach upon the other, with due process and the takings clause
serving as a check to deprivation of settled property interests.
89. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
90. See 108 S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 798. The Court acknowledged that this was the first case decided by the state's
supreme court that involved a question of the public trust interest in nonnavigable tidelands, but
concluded that "clear and unequivocal" statements in the court's earlier opinions gave ample
indication of the state's claim to its tidelands. The Court concluded that many land titles had
been adjudicated based on the tidal influence standard for tidelands, and that rather than
upsetting reasonable property-related expectations, the standard adopted by the Court reaffirmed
them. Id.
92. See id. (emphasizing the uniformity, certainty, and ease of application of the "ebb and
flow" rule for defining the reach of the public trust).
93. Id. (expressly recognizing importance of honoring reasonable expectations in private
property interests).
94. Id. at 793.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 798.
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2. The Supreme Court's Narrow Construction of Public Rights in
Private Property
In addition to implying constitutional property protections as a
limit to the public trust's reach, the Supreme Court has shown that it
may disregard the claim of a public right altogether. In Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission 9 7 the Court held that, under the particular
facts of the case, constitutional property protections outweighed pub-
lic interests in the same property. 98
In Nollan, the state coastal commission attempted to exact a public
easement across a private beach as a condition to permitting the own-
ers to develop their upland property. The Court held that the state's
action constituted a compensable taking.99 In a strong dissent, Justice
Brennan asserted that this was a case of property owners encroaching
on the public's right of access to the ocean, not the right of the public
encroaching on the right of property owners to develop their prop-
erty."° The majority declined to strike such a balance, and instead
found that no public right existed.10
Finding no preexisting public right to the property, the Court ana-
lyzed the state's denial of the development permit to determine
whether such action was a compensable taking.' The Court con-
cluded that the state's granting a permanent and continuous right to
the public to traverse a privately owned beach did constitute such a
taking. '3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court virtually ignored
97. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); see also supra note 36.
98. 107 S. Ct. at 3150. Because the Supreme Court has not developed a bona fide takings test,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987), Nollan may be
limited to its facts.
99. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
100. Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan recognized constitutional
protections of the reasonable expectations of property owners. He asserted, however, that the
property owners in this case had no reasonable claim to any expectation of excluding the public
from traversing their property to gain access to the ocean. Id. at 3154, 3158. Justice Brennan
supported his proposition with a state constitutional provision proscribing waterfront property
owners from denying public access to any navigable water in the state, when access is required
for a public purpose. Id. at 3158-59. His dissent also emphasized the primacy of state law in
defining property rights, a principle heavily relied upon by the majority in Phillip& Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 798-99 (1988).
101. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145-46. Instead, the Court found California had adopted the
general rule that persons may not trespass on private lands to get to navigable waters. The
majority rejected Justice Brenann's assertion that the state's constitution proscribed private
landowners' denial of public access to the states navigable waters on which their property fronts.
According to the Court, because the lower court did not rest its decision on the constitutional
provision, it would be improper for the Court to resolve that question of state constitutional law
in the first instance. Id. at 3146.
102. Id. at 3146-47.




precedent cited by the state court stating that acquisition of public
easements across private beaches was a legitimate exercise of the
state's public trust duties."M The Court thus evidenced a commitment
to stringent protection of private property interests by narrowly con-
struing the state's law regarding the public's right of access to naviga-
ble waters.10 5
Given these constitutional constraints, states must work within the
strictures of defined property interests in recognizing public rights in
limited state resources. Among the rights acquired through private
ownership of property, the common law has yet to recognize a right
belonging to the public at large outside the context of navigation, nui-
sance, or the public trust."6
B. Expansive Theories of Public Rights in Private Property
Some theorists argue that laissez faire notions underlying much of
common law property theory are ill suited for modem circumstances,
and advocate a concept of private property that embodies public
rights. As Professor Sax107 observes, contemporary theory is based on
the erroneous assumption that property exists in isolation. °10 Sax con-
tends that property is, in reality, part of a network. The uses of one's
property often affect others beyond the property's boundaries.10 9 Fur-
ther, American common law irrationally refuses to recognize public
rights in property simply because the public holds them cumulatively
rather than in a more conventional form of ownership." 0
Professor Sax advocates a system that would prohibit owners from
uses of their property that have a spillover effect on other property."'
104. The state court relied on cases containing strong public trust language. See, eg., Grupe
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 584-86 (1985) (the
court recognized exactions of public easements across private beaches as a condition to granting
development permits as a legitimate exercise of the state's public trust duty to maximize public
access to navigable waters).
105. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (federal government may
not open to the public a private marina created by connecting a privately owned lagoon to a
navigable bay without compensating the owner).
106. Sax, Takings, Private Property And Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 155 (1971).
107. Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley and
prominent critic of the common law tradition of property.
108. Sax, supra note 106, at 152.
109. Id at 152-53.
110. Id at 155. Professor Sax observes that public rights presently preempt private property
rights only sporadically, as in the federal navigation servitude, nuisance, and the public trust
doctrine.
I11. Id at 161-162. The types of spillover effects Professor Sax contemplates include: (1) use
of land which impinges on the uses of other land (e.g., strip mining that causes erosion to the
land below); (2) use of a common to which another landowner has an equal right (e.g., dumping
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This model would protect resources shared in common"' against the
spillover effects of private property use. For example, wetlands own-
ers would have no greater right to develop their land in derogation of
the public's right to use or otherwise enjoy it'13 than they would have
the right to dump waste on an abutting landowner's property.114 Sax's
theory, unencumbered by traditional doctrinal limitations and
rules,115 is sufficiently flexible to protect the public need wherever it
may lay. Public policy, rather than inflexible legal rules, guides
accommodation of competing interests.' 1 6 The political process insu-
lates private property rights from any radical encroachment by public
interests. 17
Despite its theoretical appeal, Sax's proposed model gives too little
weight to present day realities of property interests." 8 Professor Sax's
model of social property defines private property rights as a matter of
public policy, so the status of private property interests is dependent
on externalities." 9 Wealth could become wealth in common depend-
water from industrial use into a stream used for human water supply; other commons might
include air, silence, wetlands and visual prospect); and (3) use of property that affects the health
and well-being of others, (e.g., treatment of land with harmful chemicals). Sax's proposed model
would restrain any use of property having harmful spillover effects, no matter how severe the
economic loss of the property owner, without payment of compensation.
112. The common law doctrine of land ownership extending to the periphery of the universe
has been revised to recognize a common. According to Sax, the identification of a common
should rest on whether a resource is inextricably intertwined with the use of various properties.
See id. at 164.
113. It might be said, for instance, that the public has a right to have the property preserved
in its natural state to preserve its aesthetic value or to protect its dependent wildlife. See infra
notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
114. See Sax, supra note 106, at 162 (wetlands cited as an example of a common).
115. See supra notes 4, 5 & 85 and accompanying text.
116. Sax, supra note 106, at 172.
117. Id. at 171. According to Sax:
[T]he proper decision as to competing property uses which involve spillover effects is that
which a rational single owner would make if he were responsible for the entire network of
resources affected, and if the distribution of gains and losses among the parcels of his total
holding were a matter of indifference to him.
Id. at 172.
118. Rodgers, Bringing People Back." Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural
Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205, 211 (1982). Under present conceptions, property is
viewed by many as a virtual biological extension of the person. This theory of private property is
perhaps best represented by Locke's labor theory. The theory is based on the premise that the
right of property begins with one's own body and extends to all things made useful by one's
efforts. Id. at 209. In response to problems posed by resource limits, Locke adopted the
following proviso: appropriation of land by labor could continue only as long there are resources
left in common for others and everyone takes only what they can use. Locke, An Essay
Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in E. BARKER, SOCIAL
CONTRACT §§ 31, 33, 37, 46 (1947) (cited in Rodgers, supra, at 210).
119. Rodgers, supra note 118, at 229.
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ing on the public's perceived need, putting private property in jeop-
ardy through shifts in opinion.120 Sax's expansive view of public rights
in private property could, in effect, create a floating easement. Clouds
could be cast on property titles, having a direct and negative impact on
their assessed values, in turn affecting local real estate markets and tax
bases.12 1
Constitutional property protections proscribe such unexpected
redefinition of vested property interests.1 22 Distinct from Sax's theory,
the public trust doctrine, by confining the public's interest to defined
areas, provides the certainty demanded by a system built on private
wealth and property.
The expanding scope of state police power regulation represents
another alternative for vindicating diffuse public rights in private
property. Present law stops short of giving equal weight to public
interests and to private interests in private property.1 23 Nonetheless,
courts usually uphold regulations of private property in the public
interests of health, environment, and the locale's fiscal integrity unless
the regulations effectively deny private property owners the beneficial
use of their property. 12  Again, the determinative factors are how far
the regulation goes beyond preventing a public harm toward confer-
120. Id. at 229-30. Professor Sax asserts that any redefinition of private property interests
will only result if a balance is struck between traditional private property rights and the rights of
the diffuse public. The role of the judiciary in scrutinizing that balance would be minor, but the
courts could intervene at the extremes when the balance is found to be so misguided as to be
beyond the bounds of the police power. Sax, supra note 106, at 171. Sax fails to square his
analysis with the concern that fundamental individual rights should not be subject to redefinition
according to majoritarian views. It is this preoccupation with individual rights as opposed to
public rights that seems most bothersome to Sax.
121. See, eg., Opinion of Justices to Senate, 383 Mass. 927, 424 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (1981).
This concern was addressed by the Massachusetts Legislature in enacting a bill entitled "An Act
relative to title to tidelands lying within the city of Boston and bordering on or near the waters of
the commonwealth." (House No. 658). Id. The Legislature sought to extinguish any vestige of
state sovereignty in tidelands lying landward of a designated line. Among the specific legislative
findings were the following:
(6) clouds on title arising from asserted vestigial interests of the Commonwealth in...
littoral properties might . . . prevent development of the type which has aided in the
economic revival of Boston and would stultify growth and further reduce the tax base of the
city; (7) the public welfare would be best served by creating certainty of titles and by
eliminating 'any unexpressed, implied, imputed, or implicit rights or conditions retained by
the commonwealth.'
IdL
122. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
123. Constitutional guarantees of due process that protect private property interests from
encroachment of public interests have not been held to protect public interests in private
property. See, eg., supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 4, 5 & 85 and accompanying text.
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ring a public benefit, and how economically burdensome the regula-
tion is on the property owner. 125
C. Judicial Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine
1. Prohibiting Harmful Spillover Activities Outside the Reach of the
Public Trust Doctrine
In the wake of Orion, the Washington Supreme Court may face diffi-
cult questions about expanding the public trust doctrine. The rigid-
ness of the doctrine's traditional reach, in light of the public's
expanding interests in state resources, has given rise to difficult ques-
tions in other jurisdictions. Among these is whether harmful spil-
lovers from nonpublic trust property onto public trust lands violates
the public trust doctrine. The California Supreme Court recently
addressed this question in National A udobon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County. 126
The court in National Audobon extended the public trust doctrine's
protection to the nonnavigable tributaries of a navigable lake when
diversion of the water of those tributaries had a negative impact on the
lake's public trust values. 127 The court directed the state to consider
public trust interests when making future land use grants which may
impact public trust values. 128
125. See supra notes 5 & 85 and accompanying text.
126. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983). In National Audobon, the
California State Department of Water and Power's ("DWP") diversion of virtually the entire
flow of four of the five tributary streams of Mono Lake had caused the level of the lake to drop
drastically, seriously threatening the lake's ecosystem and scenic beauty. Mono Lake is, for now,
the second largest lake in California and a navigable waterway. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 356,
658 P.2d at 711, 719. Diversion of water from the lake's tributaries began in 1940 and was
increased in 1970. By October of 1979, the lake had shrunk from its prediversion level of 85
square miles to 60.3 square miles. Its surface level had dropped 43 feet. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at
351, 658 P.2d at 714.
127. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 352-53, 658 P.2d at 711, 715-16. Mono Lake is saline and
supports a large brine shrimp population which feeds vast numbers of nesting and migratory
birds. The lake's islands protect a large breeding colony of California gulls, and the lake serves
as a stopover for thousands of migratory birds. With diversion of the lake's tributaries, and the
consequential drop in water level, one of the lake's principal islands has become a peninsula,
exposing the gull nests to coyotes and other predators. The drop in the lake's level has also
increased the lake's salinity, causing a marked reduction in the brine shrimp population. Nearly
ninety-five percent of the state's gull population and twenty-five percent of all species nest at the
lake. In 1981, ninety-five percent of the hatched chicks did not survive to maturity. The lake's
recession also has adversely affected it scenic value.
128. The court recognized extension of the public trust doctrine to protect a myriad of public
interests. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356, 658 P.2d at 719. Relying on two previous decisions (People
ex. rel. Roberts v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co.,
66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884)) the court found that the public trust doctrine extended protection
to navigable waters from harm caused by the diversion of nonnavigable tributaries. National
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National Audobon represents a cautious expansion of the public
trust doctrine with potential application beyond the reach of a state's
navigable or tidal waters. Applying the court's reasoning, a state
might permissibly prohibit any land use'29 having a deleterious impact
on public trust interests. Contiguousness of the spillover source to the
adversely affected public trust lands need not be a requirement to reg-
ulating its use. Under this principle, the public trust would no longer
uniquely burden private owners of public trust lands. Rather, the pub-
lic trust would burden all property owners whose property-related
activities have harmful spillover effects on public trust lands. 3 °
While the court's decision in NationalAudobon expanded the effects
of the public trust beyond navigable waters, it did nothing to expand
the reach of the public trust itself. By confining the situs of the public
trust right to the state's navigable fresh waters and tidelands, the court
did not violate the uniformity and certainty of the public trust's reach.
This expansion did not offend constitutional limits.
Regulation of spillover effects on public trust resources vindicates
the public's preexisting right to the use and enjoyment of those
resources. Such regulation would put landowners and resource users
on notice that any rights acquired by them do not include the right to
harm public trust interests that, as a matter of state law, preceded
their interests. Regulation of harmful activities outside the reach of
the public trust could extend to public trust lands the same protection
a state's common law authority to prohibit nuisance accords private
property.13 ' Adoption of the California view in Washington would
represent a beneficial extension of the public trust doctrine to regulate
upland uses harmful to public trust interests. This view expands the
reach of the public trust's protection without violating the model of
uniformity and certainty provided by the doctrine's traditional reach.
Audobon, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr at 357, 658 P.2d at 720. Although the DWP's interests
in the waters of the lake's tributaries .was termed to be a usufructuary and not an ownership
interest, the court's decision could presumably be extended to the latter context as well. Id., 189
Cal. Rptr. at 361, 658 P.2d at 724.
129. Such uses might include upland development, irrigation, spraying of pesticides, or
disposal of wastes.
130. See generally Johnson, The Emerging Recognition of a Public Interest in Water: Water
Quality Control by the Public Trust Doctrine, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 128 (1988)
(essay on the public trust doctrine as a means to water quality control).
131. See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 7.2 (1984) (discussion of the common law doctrine of nuisance).
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2. The Floating Easement Approach: Up Against
Constitutional Limits
The Orion court cited with favor Just v. Marinette County, 132 a Wis-
consin case advocating an expansive view of public rights in private
property. Just serves as an example of an expansion of public rights
that could infringe on the constitutional rights of private property
owners. In Just, a county ordinance prohibited plaintiffs from placing
fill on their wetlands without a special permit.133 The ordinance
sought to preserve the public's rights in the county's navigable waters
by protecting the contiguous shorelines from the harmful effects of
uncontrolled use and development. 34 The court held that the interre-
lationship of the wetlands and shorelands with the state's public trust
duties made the ordinance a valid exercise of the state's police
power. 135
In defining the reach of the public trust in the state's navigable
waters, the court held that lands adjacent to or near navigable waters
were subject to the state's public trust powers.1 36 Further, the court
held that the ordinance did not constitute a compensable taking
because it did not confer a public benefit. 137 Rather, it protected an
existing public right to preservation of the state's wetlands. 31
The result in Just can be justified by application of the spillover the-
ory adopted in National Audobon. t 39 Several of the court's statements,
132. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
133. The ordinance in question provided for permitted uses and conditional uses. One of the
conditional uses requiring a special permit was the filling, drainage or dredging of wetlands.
"Wetlands" were defined under the ordinance as "areas where ground water is at or near the
surface much of the year or where any segment of plant cover is deemed an aquatic according to
N. C. Fassett's 'Manual of Aquatic Plants.'" Id., 201 N.W.2d at 765-66. The ordinance
covered all land within 1,000 feet of a lake, pond, or flowage. Id. at 764.
134. Id.
135. Id., 201 N.W.2d at 768.
136. Id. The traditional reach of the public trust in Wisconsin had historically been defined
as extending only to the beds underlying navigable waters. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261
Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1952).
137. Just, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
138. Id. In defining the point at which regulation of private property under the state's police
power constitutes a compensable taking, the court stated that "the necessity for monetary
compensation for loss suffered to an owner by police power restriction arises when restrictions
are placed on property in order to create a public benefit rather than to prevent a public harm."
Id., 201 N.W.2d at 767.
139. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. Washington's Shoreline Management
Act also extends protection to contiguous wetlands that lie within two hundred feet of certain of
the state's bodies of waters. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(f) (1985). The Orion court,
however, held that if the state's regulatory scheme denied Orion all reasonably profitable uses of
its property consistent with the public trust, that a taking had occurred. The case was remanded




however, depart markedly from the traditional public trust doctrine.
The Just court focused on extant public rights in preservation of all
environmental features in their natural state, not the private owner's
rights to the specific land."4 According to the court, landowners have
no absolute right to change the essential natural character of their land
and thereby injure these public rights."' The court, however, did not
offer any historical support for its claim of a preexisting public right in
private property. It also declined to acknowledge or discuss the tradi-
tional reach of the public trust doctrine. Further, the court did not
offer to define a specific range of resources or lands protected by the
public interest.142 While purportedly working within the framework
of traditional takings law, the court nevertheless departed from tak-
ings analysis by creating an existing public right in the state's natural
resources equal, if not superior, to the rights of the private owner of
those resources.
3. Orion's Application of Just v. Marinette County
Although the Orion court left the door open to expansion of the
public trust doctrine, it is improbable that the court foresaw the type
of expansion advocated by the court in Just."a3 First, the Orion court
specifically recognized the traditional reach of the public trust doc-
trine and its concomitant concept of a preexisting public right.'I Sec-
ond, in discussing possible expansion of the doctrine, the Orion court
seemed more interested in expanding the scope of the public's pro-
747 P.2d 1082-84 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988); see also Department of Natural
Resources v. Thurston County, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979); Department of Ecology v.
Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977) (state regulation under
Washington's Shoreline Management Act of private property interests in lands of ecological and
environmental significance subjected to takings analysis by the court).
140. Just, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
141. Id.
142. The United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central rejected this recognition of a public
trust in all of a state's natural resources. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
The Court recognized a fundamental difference in character between the state's title in lands
underlying navigable fresh waters and tide water and the state's title to lands intended for sale, or
the United State's title in public lands which are open to preemption and sale. The distinction
recognized by the Court is that the state's title in the beds underlying its navigable fresh waters
and tide waters is held in trust for the public uses of fishing and navigation. The Court, in
drawing such a distinction, declined to recognize a public trust in other state lands.
143. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Just was cited by the Orion court,
Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641 n.10, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.10 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988), the court's approval of the Just holding may be confined to Just's
extension of the public trust to shorelands lying totally above the water. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.58.030(2)(f) (1985).
144. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 639, 747 P.2d at 1072.
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tected interests than the doctrine's traditionally accepted reach. t4 5
Third, since its decision in Orion, the Washington court had at least
one opportunity to expand the traditional reach of the public trust
doctrine to protect the public's interest in natural resources outside the
state's shorelands and tidelands, but did not choose to do So. 1 4 6 It
appears, therefore, that the Washington court is at least tentatively
committed to the traditional confinement of the public trust to the
state's tidelands and shorelands.
III. CONCLUSION
The Orion decision marks a watershed in Washington public trust
law. After nearly a century of commercial exploitation of Washing-
ton's plentiful tidelands and shorelands, the state has asserted its role
as trustee for the public in protecting one of its most valuable public
resources. Recent steps taken by state and local governments in
Washington reflect a strong commitment to preservation of the state's
tideland and shoreland resources for the public interest. Increasing
public need may seem to justify expansion of the state's public trust
interest in the future. In assessing the prospects for further expansion
of the public trust's reach, however, constitutional limitations cannot
be discounted.
145. Id. at 640-41, 747 P.2d at 1073. The court did observe that the doctrine had been
expanded beyond its water-based context to be applied to public lands that have a special
importance for health, welfare, and safety of the public. Id. at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10.
The court did not recognize a similar expansion of the doctrine to private lands beyond its water-
based context, except to those lands that are contiguous to the water. Id. However, it cited with
approval the Just court's proposition that property owners do not have an absolute right to use
their property in a manner for which it is unsuited in its natural state. Id. at 659, 747 P.2d at
1083.
146. See Allingham v. Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988). In Allingham, the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated a city zoning ordinance requiring that a large percentage
of certain privately owned lots be retained in or restored to a natural state. Id. at 948, 749 P.2d at
161. The ordinance regulated development in 14 designated greenbelt areas, which were
primarily linear bands of undeveloped, treed hillsides, about half of which were privately owned.
Id. at 949, 749 P.2d at 161. The court recognized that the ordinance advanced legitimate public
interests in providing buffers between incompatible land uses, mitigating the effects of noise and
air pollution, limiting development of environmentally sensitive areas unsuitable for building,
maintaining habitat for wildlife, and relieving the monotony of continuous urban development.
Id. at 952, 749 P.2d at 163. The court, however, did not recognize an extant public right to
preservation of these lands in their natural state. Instead, the court found that the ordinance
deprived certain landowners of all profitable use of a substantial portion of their land, and
therefore constituted a taking without compensation of those portions affected by the ordinance.
Id. at 952-53, 749 P.2d at 163-64. The public trust doctrine was not at issue in Allingham.




The historical reach of the public trust doctrine as defined in Wash-
ington's constitution and by prior case law represents an established
boundary between public trust and private property interests. Federal
constitutional protections of private property stand at the boundary,
limiting the state's power to expand the reach of the public trust.
Imposition of a public trust burden, without the support of a preexist-
ing public right, might seriously impair or supplant property interests,
exposing the state's action to constitutional challenges.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized significant state
discretion in defining the scope and reach of the public trust doctrine
within the borders of each state. 47 The Court appears to be commit-
ted, however, to adherence to the doctrine's traditional reach within
each state. The Court apparently intends such tradition to serve as a
predictable model of public rights upon which private property inter-
ests and expectations can be established. The Court has also shown a
tendency to be protective of private property interests even in the face
of strong, countervailing public interests.148
Much can be done, however, to shore up the state's public trust
interest within its defined reach. Proscribing upland activity harmful
to public trust values could reinforce the public's interest by extending
to it the same protection accorded private property by the law of nui-
sance. Such proscription would do nothing to extend the public trust's
reach, but would give teeth to public trust rights within their historical
reach.
Steven W. Turnbull
147. Phillips Petroleum Co.v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
148. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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